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osting by EAbstract Spam is a serious threat to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) world-
wide. It is used to not only transmit unsolicited messages, but also malware of every stripe and to
propagate various types of phishing schemes. Spam has become so internationally wide-spread that
in some regions it represents over 90% of the total e-mail trafﬁc.
The purpose of this paper is to report the ﬁndings of the study commissioned by the Communi-
cations and Information Technology Commission to ascertain the magnitude of spam in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and formulate a comprehensive multi-pronged solution for handling
spam in Saudi Arabia based upon best international practices, current situation and national
requirements.
This paper will only focus on determining the current state of spam in KSA, focusing on obtain-
ing a good understanding of the nature and prevalence of spam within Saudi Arabia. This informa-
tion will then form the basis upon which the anti-spam national strategy framework will be based.
The study was compiled using the statistics that were gathered from stakeholders via different
means including questionnaires, interviews and meetings. It covers e-mail, mobile and fax spam.
It also highlights some of the stakeholders’ concerns and recommendations regarding spam, as well
as the measures taken by these stakeholders to control spam in their networks.
ª 2011 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.y. Production and hosting by
Saud University.
lsevier1. Introduction
Internet service was introduced into the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia pursuant to Royal Decree number 163 (1997), with
the actual service itself coming online on 28/8/1419H (15th
December 1998).
The construction of the national infrastructure, the related
awareness efforts and the learning curve being experienced by
all key stakeholders necessitated a gradual uptake of Internet
service in KSA. Therefore, both the full beneﬁts and the draw-
backs of this service took some time to come to light.
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maturity and stability and it was deemed time for oversight of
this service to be transferred from KACST1 to the CITC2, with
the physical handoff occurring in 10/1427H (November 2006),
pursuant to Royal Decree 229 (2004). At this point, core Inter-
net service was considered to have achieved stability and CITC
initiated numerous national projects to develop added-value
services to the core Internet service. Among them was the na-
tional KSA anti-spam framework. Following further consider-
ation, this initiative was expanded to cover the whole spectrum
of ICT services, including fax and mobile spam.
In parallel to the above developments, during the Geneva
phase of the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS)3, spam was identiﬁed by the international community
as a potential threat to the full utilization of the Internet and e-
mail. Accordingly, WSIS participants recognized that spam is
a ‘‘signiﬁcant and growing problem for users, networks and
the Internet as a whole’’ (WSIS Declaration, 2003, paragraph
37) and that, in order to build conﬁdence and security in the
use of ICTs, there is a need to ‘‘take appropriate action at both
national and international levels’’ (WSIS Plan of Action, 2003,
paragraph C5, d).
The acknowledgment that spam is a problem at the global
level, contributed to the fostering of various activities in the
ﬁeld. Countries, including KSA, became aware of the need
to take action on this issue, and recognized the fundamental
importance of international cooperation and coordination.
In October 2004, the World Telecommunication Standard-
ization Assembly (WTSA, 2004), adopted resolution 51 – com-
bating spam. This resolution instructs the TSB Director, in
cooperation with the Directors of the other Bureaux and the
Secretary-General to prepare urgently a report to the Council
on relevant ITU and other international initiatives for counter-
ing spam, and to propose possible follow-up actions for con-
sideration by the Council.
The second phase (Tunis phase) of the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS) held from November 16
through 18, 2005, in Tunis, Tunisia, witnessed the adoption
of the ‘‘Tunis Commitment (2005)’’ and the ‘‘Tunis Agenda
for the Information Society (2005)’’ During this summit, at-
tended by representatives from KSA, deliberations were made
upon (i) concrete measures and mechanisms for implementa-
tion of the ‘‘Geneva Declaration of Principles’’ and the ‘‘Plan
of Action’’ and (ii) issues not yet decided at the Geneva Phase,
including the Internet Governance. At the closing plenary, the
‘‘Tunis Commitment’’ and the ‘‘Tunis Agenda for the Infor-
mation Society,’’ were adopted.
Paragraph 41 of the WSIS Tunis Agenda ﬁnally stated:
‘‘We resolve to deal effectively with the signiﬁcant and grow-
ing problem posed by spam. We take note of current multilat-
eral, multi-stakeholder frameworks for regional and
international cooperation on spam, for example, the APEC
Anti-Spam Strategy, the London Action Plan, the Seoul Mel-
bourne Anti-Spam Memorandum of Understanding and the
relevant activities of OECD and ITU. We call upon all stake-
holders, to adopt a multi-pronged approach to counter spam
that includes, inter alia, consumer and business education;1 King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology.
2 Communications and Information Technology Commission.
3 The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in
Geneva. 10–12 December 2003.appropriate legislation, law enforcement authorities and tools;
the continued development of technical and self-regulatory
measures; best practices; and international cooperation.’’
Regardless of methodology undertaken in combating spam
in KSA, it was immediately recognized that any proposed
framework solution would require certain core information
to be present beforehand. Most prominent among this infor-
mation is:
(1) Ofﬁcial, uniﬁed and legal deﬁnition of spam in KSA.
(2) Identiﬁcation of the key stakeholders, and subsequently.
(3) Identiﬁcation of the size of the problem.
As such a study had never before been conducted in KSA,
therefore, it is hoped that the results of this study will be
invaluable not only in the development of this national anti-
spam national framework, but also as a basis for the work
of other researchers in future, Allah willing.
In this study, all pertinent stakeholders were identiﬁed, an
ofﬁcial deﬁnition of spam was proposed and a framework
for the collection of spam-related statistics was developed. This
framework covers e-mail, SMS and fax and is focused on three
aspects. First, the deﬁnition of spam and related spam indica-
tors where ‘‘spam rate’’ is deﬁned as the percentage of spam
compared to the total number of received messages. Second,
the identiﬁcation of sources for spam related statistics where,
in addition to interviews, ﬁlters and anti-spam tools used by
organizations and ISPs were the main source for determining
e-mail spam while gateways and servers owned by mobile ser-
vice providers were used to calculate SMS spam. Third, the
collection of spam statistics achieved by inspecting published
reliable data and by conducting survey, interviews and discus-
sions with relevant personnel including CITC, KACST, MOC,
MOI, SAMA,4 companies, ﬁnancial services institutions,
Internet service providers, data service providers, bulk SMS
licensees, mobile operators, solution providers and others.
It was decided that the necessary background information
needed to formulate an effective national KSA anti-spam pol-
icy framework could be broken down into the following
studies:
(1) The current state of SPAM in the Kingdom (summa-
rized in brief in this research paper).
(2) A comprehensive international study of noteworthy anti-
spam efforts in eight short-listed countries of relevance.
(3) A comprehensive international study of noteworthy
anti-spam efforts in international bodies of relevance.
(4) A study of current and emerging anti-spam technologies.
(5) A study of past legal cases in KSA, plus current anti-
spam-related legislation in the Kingdom and identiﬁca-
tion of key stakeholders.
As recommended by the well know international bodies, to
combat spam, different areas shall be addressed in the ﬁnal
comprehensive policy framework, such as legal, enforcement,
technical, awareness, industry assistance, codes of conduct,
etc.4 -CITC, Communications and Information Technology Commis-
sion; SAMA, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; KACST, King
Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology; MOC, Ministry of
Commerce; MOI, Ministry of Interior.
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bust enforcement, ensuring industry assistance, running aware-
ness programs, implementing technical solutions, ongoing
monitoring of spam rates and focusing the control on commer-
cial spam we can reduce the amount of spam signiﬁcantly in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This study comprises the ﬁrst
step in that direction.
2. Methodology and implementation
This study used a three step approach to collecting the re-
quired information on the status of spam in the Kingdom.
These three steps were:
Agree on an initial deﬁnition of spam that could be used as
the basis for collecting information.
Identify and agree to the likely sources of spam related sta-
tistics and the stakeholders who could be of assistance in
this regard. This was done by exhaustively identifying all
stages of the spam lifecycle and then, for each stage of that
lifecycle, identifying all key stakeholders.
Collection of the spam statistics from the identiﬁed stake-
holders. The key method used for collecting the data was
questionnaires and interviews targeted at selected organiza-
tions, vendors and ISPs. Some additional statistics were
also collected by service providers on their SMS gateways
focusing on the number of SMS messages received by
mobile phones in Saudi Arabia.
2.1. Identiﬁcation spam lifecycle and stakeholders
The typical spam activity lifecycle can be broken down as
follows:
(1) The recipient address (e-mail, fax number and mobile
number) is captured and stored in a repository for a spe-
ciﬁc purpose
(2) The spammer harvests speciﬁc address details, which is
then used for spamming activities.
(3) The spam message is carried by certain media (ISPs,
mobile service providers, etc.).
(4) The message is received by a mail host (mail service pro-
vider, banks, etc.).Figure 1 Spam activ(5) The end-user (receiver) receives the message.
(6) If required, the receiver reports the spam to the appro-
priate authority.
(7) The designated authority enforces the applicable laws
(prosecution and sentencing).
Key stakeholders are involved in each of the spam activity
lifecycle stages. The 7 stages are depicted below (in Fig. 1):
Proﬁles and examples of some of the stakeholder groups
identiﬁed above are presented in the following:
2.2. Obtaining personal details
A number of organizations, such as banks, Retailers, ISPs,
MSPs, Telcos, Mail service providers, etc. capture and store
details of customers or subscribers. These details are mostly
captured for speciﬁc purposes, which are typically authorized
by the associated person. A number of these organizations
are bound by internal Privacy policies, which prevent them
from using the information for any purpose other than the
purpose for which the information was collected. In some
cases, some of these organizations may take the approval of
the associated person to use these contact details for the pur-
pose of e-marketing. Some of these organizations may also sell
contact details of their subscribers to other bodies, who then
use them for spamming purposes. The availability of this store
of contact information and personal details is often a key
source of contact information for spammers.
2.3. Media stakeholders
Having collected relevant information, the spammer then
sends the spam messages over certain media to the receivers.
The media used for this purpose could vary, and could involve
media owned by stakeholders such as Internet service provid-
ers, mobile service providers, data service providers, Bulk SMS
service providers, etc. These stakeholders are relevant because
at times the media owner may knowingly or unknowingly pro-
vide the platform for the spammer to carry out his activities.
2.4. Mail host stakeholders
The spam mail is then received by the host of the mail box
belonging to the receiver. The mail host could be either a maility lifecycle stages.
9 They provide the technical solutions that are critical to reduce
spam. Two solution service providers were met while others were
contacted via e-mail and over phone (examples: Symantec, Sophos,
ISS, CLEAR SWIFT, SurfControl, others).
10 Licensed to provide Internet connections to corporations, individ-
uals and governmental agencies, and hence, they are the carriers of
electronic communications, mainly e-mails. Two major ISPs were
interviewed while 15 other ISPs participated in the survey.
11 Thirty-six companies of varying size and locality were included in
the study and detailed meetings were conducted with two of them.
12 Aside from the vast number of beneﬁciaries among the students,
faculty and staff, university networks are generally vulnerable to
hackers using the universities’ machines as botnets. As such, univer-
sities computers become zombies where spamers ﬁnd it attractive to
48 M.A. Al-Kadhiservice provider or organizations that provide corporate mail
service to their employees. These stakeholders are relevant be-
cause they often employ ﬁlters and such devices to control the
spam addressed to their mail service subscribers.
2.5. Reporting process stakeholders
Once the receiver receives the spam message, he may wish to
report this incident to a suitable organizational unit within
the Kingdom, particularly if some damage was caused as a re-
sult of the spam. Typically the organizational unit to whom the
receiver can report spam would vary by kind, origin and con-
tent of the spam. For example, the receiver may report such
spam messages to banks, the company that he/she works with,
or relevant Government agencies.
2.6. Enforcement process stakeholders
Once the report is submitted and it is determined that the
spammer was guilty of sending the spam to the receiver, the
spammer is punished by a stakeholder responsible for enforce-
ment of the anti-spam regulations. The enforcement agencies
could vary by severity and type of spam sent and would typi-
cally include agencies like Courts and/or relevant Ministries.
There are two major enforcement agencies in KSA related to
spam. They are the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Com-
munications and Information Technology Commission
(CITC).
2.7. Summary of stakeholder role and scope
There are a number of stakeholders involved in the spam activ-
ity life-cycle. Each of them plays different roles in the context
of the spam life cycle. In order to be effective, it is imperative
that the anti-spam policy framework should address most, if
not all, of these stakeholders. Identiﬁcation of these stakehold-
ers is also key to effective benchmarking of the state of spam in
KSA. This study has short-listed in the following section the
key stakeholders most relevant to the goals of this study.
Those are the stakeholders who were contacted for participa-
tion in this study’s questionnaire.
2.8. Stakeholders involved in the questionnaire
The following list represents the stakeholders who were in-
cluded in the ‘current state assessment’ research (questionnaire
based survey and/or interviews) conducted by the survey team:
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).5
Data service providers (DSPs)/facility based providers
(FBPs).6
Mobile service providers (MSPs).7
Bulk SMS licensees.85 The central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, charged with
supervising commercial banks.
6 Licensed media stakeholders providing Internet gateway connec-
tivity for ISPs to the Internet.
7 Licensed to provide the SMS/MMS infrastructure required to
transmit and receive messages between mobile phones. All MSPs were
interviewed.
8 More than 90 licensed companies (class B licenses) which allow
them to resell SMS/MMS services in bulk from MSPs.Solution providers.9
Internet service providers (ISPs).10
Companies.11
Universities.12
Ministry of interior (MOI).13
Communications and Information Technology Commis-
sion (CITC).14
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology
(KACST)/Internet Services Unit (ISU).15
2.9. Questionnaire-based survey results
This section highlights the ﬁndings that we generated using the
statistics provided by stakeholders in the answers to our
questionnaires.
(1) Spam deﬁnition question (Fig. 2).
(2) Questions related to the magnitude of the problem
(Figs. 3–9).
(3) Questions related to methods of addressing spam
(Figs. 10–22).
3. Findings and analysis
3.1. Stakeholders major concerns and recommendations
Interviews were conducted with the identiﬁed stakeholders,
using structured questionnaires, in order to obtain feedback
on their views and concerns on the status of spam in Saudi
Arabia. The major concerns and recommendations of the var-
ious stakeholders with regard to spam have been summarized
in this section.
All stakeholders mentioned the fact that there is currently
no central law in Saudi Arabia to regulate spam. However,
there are some spam-related provisions that are scattered over
different laws and licensing requirements/agreements. For this
reason, there are no regulations regarding the collections, use,launch their attacks.
13 MOI is the owner of the Anti e-Crime Act and thus plays an
important role in combating spam. MOI has recently established a new
division in charge of investigating eCrimes. Cooperation between
MOI, CITC, SAMA and other stakeholders is critical for ensuring that
spam is efﬁciently combated.
14 The CITC is charged with regulating the telecommunications
sector in the Kingdom. It oversees the application of the Telecommu-
nications Act, its Bylaw and the Ordinance of the CITC.
15 Serving as the national ‘‘Academic/Research sector ISP’’ in KSA.
16 A Zombie computer (often abbreviated zombie) is a computer
attached to the Internet that has been compromised by a security
cracker, a computer virus, or a trojan horse. Most owners of zombie
computers are unaware that their system is being used in this way.
Zombies have been used extensively to send e-mail spam.
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and phone numbers. Some stakeholders also highlighted the
lack of cooperation between various agencies in combating
spam. For instance, SAMA, MOI, and CITC have developed
an informal procedure to cooperate regarding spam/phishing
related issues. However, there is no formal process in place
for handling complaints and forwarding them to the appropri-
ate authorities. It was also raised that there is no code of con-
duct for ISPs or e-marketers in Saudi Arabia.
Spam e-mails, in addition to being an annoyance are caus-
ing capacity, bandwidth and staff performance problems. Dur-
ing the meetings held with the various stakeholders, many
points were raised and some stakeholders suggested some tech-
nical controls as well.
Some stakeholders suggested that CITC should promote
the establishment of Commercial Secure Mail Hosting
providers who receive e-mails on behalf of companies and ﬁlter
them before delivering them to the mail servers of the
companies.
3.1.1. ISPs
ISPs highlighted their shortage of technically capable staff.
They indicated that they are understaffed and thus are not
capable of addressing the spam issue extensively. ISPs also
indicated that they install tools/ﬁlters to protect the mailboxes
of the customers who decide to use the e-mail servers of the
ISPs. As such, ISPs do not ﬁlter all the trafﬁc ﬂowing through
their networks due to the existing constraints in budgets, re-
sources and capacities. However, one of the ﬁndings is that
ISPs who have deployed RBLs on their routers or Gateways,
report a lower spam rate, as do their clients.
3.1.2. DSPs
DSPs highlighted their shortage of technically capable staff.
They indicated that they are understaffed and thus are not
capable of addressing the spam issue extensively. DSPs also
indicated that they do not have existing controls for spam e-
mails and they strongly advise that spam ﬁlters should be
decentralized at the ISP level and below since these ﬁlters
might introduce degradation in the quality of service offered
by DSPs if installed on their backbones. However, DSPs
agreed that RBLs might be deployed on their routers to ensure
that known spammers cannot send e-mails to users in the
Kingdom, yet they stressed on the fact that these blacklists
need to be very accurate since they might result in blocking
legitimate trafﬁc.
3.1.3. MSPs
Mobile service providers (MSPs) suggested that SMS spam
regulations should focus on bulk SMS licenses and should ex-
clude advertisements. They also suggested that it is important
to control websites’ registries as an ancillary element to setup
accountability and to control websites sending SMS spam.
MSPs receive daily huge numbers of SMSes originating
from outside Saudi Arabia. Some of these messages are spam
messages. Although their current systems do not contain
sophisticated ﬁlters to identify spam SMSes, MSPs have devel-
oped some controls to ensure that bulk SMS sent internation-
ally are inspected and blocked if deemed spam. Additionally,
the MSPs are upgrading their systems to ensure that they
can apply smarter controls to combat spam. The mobile oper-
ators reported that the SMS spam rate ranges between 1.25%and 1.75%. This rate is, however, suspect due to many consid-
erations, among them that MSPs tend to shy away from deﬁn-
ing revenue-generating SMS messages, regardless of content,
as spam, and thus, deserving of combat.
3.1.4. Bulk SMS service providers
Bulk SMS providers suggested the development and enforce-
ment of an anti-spam law with severe penalties as the best
way to control SMS spam. Moreover, in order to know the
Bulk SMS providers who originated the message, Bulk compa-
nies suggested that this could be achieved by tracking the pre-
mium numbers included in the messages sent. The tracking
should be done in coordination with the mobile service
providers.
3.1.5. SAMA
SAMA took many initiatives targeted at ﬁghting phishing,
whether by encouraging the banks to join international organi-
zations to ﬁght phishing, or by coordination the efforts with
CITC to block access to the phishing source website. SAMA
also does regular follow-ups with banks which have been sub-
ject to phishing attacks, after closing the phishing website to
assess any possible damage that could have happened as a re-
sult. Additionally, SAMA stated that they have strict measures
to be undertaken by banks operating under SAMA’s license
and the Saudi Banking Law. SAMA does conduct regular
audits to ensure that all ﬁnancial institutions are adhering to
SAMA’s regulations.
Moreover, SAMA has published security guidelines for the
banks on its website www.sama.gov.sa and has recorded 72
phishing attacks on Saudi banks during the last year.
SAMA also mentioned that the current cooperation in law
enforcement is not efﬁcient as SAMA has to coordinate be-
tween MOI and CITC in order to issue an order for blocking
a phishing website through CITC. The bureaucracy sometimes
causes severe delays before an action could be taken against
the offenders.
3.1.6. MOI
MOI suggested that either CITC or the newly established eCri-
mes Fighting Unit is to be contacted for reporting spam. Then,
the case would be forwarded to the Bureau of Investigation
and Prosecution who might use the technical skills of other
agencies including CITC.
3.1.7. Universities
Universities recognized that their networks and machines are
attractive to spammers since they can turn them into Zom-
bies16. Thus Universities have deployed various security con-
trols to mitigate the issues of spam. However, some of the
universities do not allow the students to use their Laptops to
access the Internet using the University networks due to the
shortage of existing resources. Once this access is granted,
the threats of spam might increase and thus additional security
controls might be needed. Universities also suggested that a
Cybercrime law should be in place to combat spam. Universi-
100%
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Figure 2 Spam deﬁnition agreement.
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critical to educate people.
3.1.8. KACST–ISU
The ISU division in KACST indicated that currently they do
not ﬁlter the bandwidth provided to universities to clean it
from spam, however, they might consider the idea of offering
ﬁltered bandwidth to universities especially that universities do
not have the required technical resources needed to deploy
those technically complex solutions.
ISU stressed on the importance of signing agreements with
other countries and already existing international enforcement
agencies. ISU suggested the cooperation with regional bodies
in the GCC. Moreover, it also suggested that the reporting
mechanism should be clear and straightforward while enforce-
ment should be very simple and international cooperation is
critical to achieve this.
3.1.9. Companies
Most companies use anti-spam softwares to ﬁlter spam e-
mails. Although some companies have huge databases of cus-
tomer related information on their databases, these companies
have not invested heavily to protect the secrecy of this infor-
mation and thus prohibit spammers from harvesting this infor-
mation. This is also due to the fact that the protection of this
information is not enforced by law.
Companies that are hit by spam have not developed pro-
grams to educate users on how to use the Internet while min-
imizing the entities who know their e-mail addresses and thus
minimize the probability that spammers can discover their e-
mail addresses.
3.1.10. Banks
Banks suggest that control measures and a clear reporting pro-
cedure should be enforced in case the spam is originated using
a local ISP. Additionally, a formal procedure for reporting
phishing complaints is being developed currently in conjunc-
tion with the banks as are user education and awareness
guidelines.17 Electronic messages that was sent without the stated or inferred
consent of the recipient and are of an advertising or promotional
nature.
18 Messages that are sent in numbers exceeding a predeﬁned threshold
in a predeﬁned period of time.3.2. Key survey ﬁndings
Our ﬁndings are divided into three main categories:
Spam deﬁnition.
Magnitude of the problem.
The manner in which stakeholders currently address spam.
3.3. Spam deﬁnition
One of the key issues which needs to be resolved when dealing
with spam is the formal deﬁnition of what is meant by the
word and when a message is or is not considered to be spam.
Without such a formal deﬁnition, it would be impossible to
measure spam, calculate spam rates, classify spam categories
prosecute spam, or perform any useful study or analysis of
spam.
Therefore, and due to the absence of any formal and legal
deﬁnition of spam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it was
deemed necessary to generate a proposed deﬁnition whichcould subsequently be suggested to the participants of this sur-
vey with a solicitation of their feedback on its wording.
In order to arrive at an initial suggested formal deﬁnition
for spam, a preliminary international survey was performed
speciﬁcally targeting nine prominent and carefully selected
countries around the world to gain insight into the deﬁnitions
adopted by other nations in their anti-spam initiatives. Due to
the scope and breadth of that study and the need to remain fo-
cused in this one, it was deemed appropriate to separate that
study into an independent research paper on international
spam best practices and benchmarking, which will, Allah will-
ing, be published in the near future.
Once the preliminary suggested spam deﬁnition was formal-
ized, it was introduced into the list of survey questions and
opinions were solicited regarding its appropriateness, compre-
hensiveness and focus. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the majority of
stakeholders in Saudi Arabia agree on the deﬁnition of spam
that we have proposed in our questionnaire (97.4% approval
rate). The deﬁnition of spam used in the survey was:
unsolicited17 bulk18 messages and communications containing
commercial, abusive or objectionable content and which are
sent out in bulk to people or individuals without their consent
by e-mail, fax, or instant messages such as SMS.
This preliminary deﬁnition was also used as a basis upon
which the respondents could frame their responses to the sub-
sequent survey questions.
Note: As an aside, this deﬁnition was later further slightly
reﬁned into its current formal and accepted form by adding
the ‘‘technology neutrality’’ concept, greater clarity of the
‘‘opt-in’’ concept, and clearer alignment with the recently-
introduced anti eCrimes law to the deﬁnition as follows:
‘‘Any unsolicited electronic message that contains commer-
cial or objectionable content transmitted without prior con-
sent through any communication media including, but not
limited to, e-mails, Mobile Messaging, fax, Bluetooth and
instant messaging services.’’3.4. Identifying key stakeholders
Further, in order to perform a comprehensive national study
of spam and its impact, it is necessary to deﬁne a representative
25%
5%
5%64%
Sexual Religious Others Direct Marketing
Figure 3 Respondents’ views on most common types of spam.
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pants. To this end, much effort was expended in identifying
the national entities directly involved in regulating, selling,
transmitting, enforcing, restricting, monitoring, generating or
receiving spam in KSA. This grouping of key stakeholders
was instrumental and pivotal in the success of this survey
and the list may further be re-utilized in the future for fol-
low-up surveys in this ﬁeld.
3.5. Magnitude of the problem
This section of the study shows the magnitude of the spam
problem in the Kingdom.
With regard to scope of the problem, it became clear after
tallying the results that e-mail suffers noticeably from spam in
KSA. International estimates peg spam rates at above 80%19,
with some industry experts’ metrics setting the bar closer to
95%20. Therefore, although the KSA survey average rate of
51%21 may appear to be comparatively mild, it is still a signif-
icant threat in that one out of every two e-mail messages in
KSA on average is a spam message.
Statistics collected from other sources such as companies,
was ignored since it was considered that:
Some of the companies provided guesstimates since they
did not procure reporting tools that can generate such
information readily.
Other companies have reported their statistics, however,
their spam rate was skewed by the fact that some ISPs do
deploy RBLs on their gateways and thus block a substan-
tial amount of spam messages before they reach these
companies.
Figures obtained from anti-spam product vendors, such as
Message Labs and Symantec, appeared quite close to the num-
bers obtained from the panel of ISPs. Message Labs22 reported
the spam rate in KSA for the year 2006 to be around23 48.3%
whereas Symantec24 reported the spam rate for the year 2006
to be around 59%. Message Labs reports the spam rate for
the year 2007 (till July) to be around 42.7%.
Further, it is quite likely that the use of RBLs at some ISPs
has skewed-down the actual KSA spam rate.
As regards spam content classiﬁcation, ‘‘Direct Marketing/
commercial’’ rose to the top of the list at 64% making it the
number one type of e-mail spam, as shown in Fig. 3. 25% of
the respondents considered Sexual e-mail to be the most com-19 http://www.messagelabs.co.uk/resources/press/8413.
20 http://www.barracudanetworks.com/ns/news_and_events/index.
php?nid=232.
21 Multiple ISPs participated in the survey for the duration of 8
months. However, we only considered the statistics of the months
where multiple ISPs provided us with accurate numbers. Also, this
number represents the spam average across these months.
22 The data provided by Message Labs are based on statistics and
analysis on a range of e-mail security threats worldwide. MessageLabs
Intelligence is based on live data feeds pulled from its global network
of control towers that scan millions of e-mails daily.
23 This number was obtained by averaging various spam rates
collected from different physical sensors.
24 The data used in this analysis are based on the spam messages
detected by Symantec Probe Network sensors deployed in over 180
countries.mon type of spam, while only 5% considered religious spam to
be a major type of spam received. Accordingly, controlling
commercial spam has the potential to reduce the amount of
spam substantially.
There was no real surprise regarding the dominance of di-
rect marketing and sexual content in spam as this is the general
trend worldwide. Further breakdown of direct marketing re-
vealed that the majority of the message contents fell under
the ‘‘other’’ category, which appears to indicate a weakness
in our initial selection of suggested categories.
Also, since most recipients categorized messages promoting
the sale of ‘‘Viagra’’ (or alternatives) under ‘‘direct market-
ingﬁ other’’ categories rather than under the ‘‘sexual’’ cate-
gory, perhaps it would be beneﬁcial to study the
combination of such content under one ‘‘sexual’’ heading in
the future (via printed instructions to the survey respondent).
Performing this calculation here, we ﬁnd that roughly
25%+ (65% · 64%) = 67% of e-mail spam could be classi-
ﬁed under the broad heading of ‘‘sexual services, products or
pictures’’. In other words, it is a matter of perspective. If we
are looking at the issue from the ﬁnancial vs. non-ﬁnancial per-
spective, then ‘‘non-ﬁnancial sexual’’ content represents 25%
of all spam e-mails. However, if we remove the ‘‘ﬁnancial’’
attribute as a classiﬁcation criterion, then fully 67% of the e-
mail spam messages deal with sexual topics service or products
in one fashion or another. Again, this appears to follow the
general international trend and is actually not unexpected as
almost all of these messages are sources overseas and do not
discriminate across country boarders.
On the other hand, at the time of the collection of the raw
spam survey statistics (8 months in 2007), SMS spam appears
to have been a relatively trivial issue with the reported spam
rate ranging between 1.25% and 1.75%25. However, due to
the high dependence of this study on data voluntarily provided
by commercial mobile providers, and due to the lucrative rev-
enue-generating nature of SMS spam to these companies and
their narrow focus on combating only foreign-sourced SMS
messages (i.e. non-revenue generating SMS spam) in their vol-
untary spam-combating efforts, therefore, the ﬁnal accuracy of
these numbers may justiﬁably be called into question.25 It is interesting to note that at the time of the conduction of this
survey, SMS spam was still a relatively novel concept in KSA. One
year later, informal observation conﬁrms that the rate of SMS spam
has risen dramatically. Possibly over tenfold. It would be beneﬁcial to
re-conduct the survey again now to compare the results. Also, it is
believed that this study will be of value in providing a fairly accurate
estimation of when SMS spam actually began its rise in KSA and in
providing an initial base benchmarking value against which we can
compare future spam rate values.
52 M.A. Al-KadhiThe same general reasoning applies to the Bulk SMS
Licensees contacted in this survey as the generation of bulk
SMS messages is their core business. Strict conformance is
not always observed at all times by all these companies to li-
cense regulations requiring them to obtain prior consent of
the recipient. These companies further state that they receive
no more than about 100 complaints per month from end users,
however, since the product/service advertisements broadcast
by these companies relate to third parties, it is not easy for
an end-user to identify the bulk messaging company responsi-
ble for sending them the message in question and they will
need to expend time and effort to track them down. A task
likely not deemed justiﬁable except by those recipients with
the greatest grievances. Thus it becomes clear that the pro-
posed KSA anti-spam framework will need to include provi-
sion for clearly identifying the bulk messager to the end user
as well as clear, swift and effective opt-out mechanisms.
To be fair, a mobile provider will be justiﬁably hesitant to
classify as spam SMS all messages sent by licensed bulk mar-
keters. The national bulk marketers may or may not have ob-
tained prior approval from the end recipients to receive their
messages, but from the mobile company’s perspective these na-
tional bulk marketing companies have signed commercial
agreements with them to utilize their mobile networks to trans-
mit · number of SMS messages at a given monetary rate. Sim-
ilar contracts do not exist between the mobile provider and the
end users, therefore, subsequent individual user complaints are
handled on a reactive basis as deemed appropriate.
Regardless, one year down the road (the end of 2008) a gen-
eral consensus was conveyed both in the public media and on5%
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8% 0%
Phishing Other Marketing Sports Education
Finance Computer Software Leisure / Travel
Figure 4 Breakdown of respondents’ views on direct marketing
types of spam.
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Figure 5 Percentage of companies who consider that sthe street that SMS spam had increased dramatically in KSA.
This could not be scientiﬁcally and objectively conﬁrmed at the
time of the publication of this study so it is suggested that a
new study be performed to compare the current state with
the results published here, and optimally to beneﬁt from the
lessons learned in this study with regard to possible conﬂicts
of interest.
Respondents considered that Finance (11%). Sports (8%)
and Computer Software related messages (8%), were the pre-
dominant types of commercial spam messages. The other types
of spam were either related to phishing or education. A big
part of the spam messages received were clubbed under the
‘‘Other marketing messages’’. Respondents indicated that by
‘‘Other marketing messages’’ they were referring to messages
promoting for the illegal sales of products (e.g. Viagra) (Fig. 4).
As shown in Fig. 5, 78% of companies that responded to
the survey believe that the primary impact of spam was on
their e-mail server resources. 72% believed that it congested
their network. Other major impacts included the time spent
by their technical people to deal with spam (61% of the
respondents). Surprisingly, only 42% stated that spam reduced
employee’s performance.
When ISPs were asked to specify the impacts that spam has
on their organizations, the results came in as shown in Fig. 6.
67% of ISPs believed that customers were most affected by
spam. Bandwidth and productivity were also highly affected
as per 42% of the ISPs. Respondents also reported that the
bandwidth consumed by spam ranged from 5% to 25% of
the total bandwidth.
Fax spam was not considered by any of the respondents to
be a major source of spam in the Kingdom. Fig. 7 represents42%
61%
72%
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% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
pam impacted them as per the criteria in the graph.
17%
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Figure 6 Percentage of ISPs who consider that spam impacted
them as per the criteria in the graph.
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Figure 7 Fax spam received.
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Figure 9 Percentage of bulk SMS licensees who send bulk SMS
messages as per the criteria in the graph.31
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Figure 10 Percentage of respondents who deployed e-mail anti-
spam Tools/ﬁlters (Incoming).
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to be spam. According to respondents, fax spam is not a major
issue in Saudi Arabia. Most of the fax spam received tended to
be commercial in nature, with 84% of the respondents con-
ﬁrming that commercial spam was the most common form
of spam received by fax. So, here again we see the trend toward
‘‘Direct Marketing’’ being the major culprit (Fig. 8).
Bulk SMS providers offer 3 main types of services: product
promotions, service promotions, and advertisements on behalf
of others. Messages sent through their respective units are usu-
ally either Direct Marketing, religious or political as shown in
Fig. 9. It is obvious that the vast majority of Bulk SMS Licens-
ees send Direct Marketing Messages.
Interestingly, Bulk SMS Licensees stated that they only re-
ceive around 100 complaints per month. Some of them (17%)
even state that they donot even receive any complaints. This
may be due to the fact that users cannot tell who is the real
originator of the SMS that they have received.
Regarding company network resources, it was clear from
the responses received that a very signiﬁcant impact was ob-
served by the participants on their underlying infrastructures
(e-mail server, network, etc.) as a result of spam proliferation,
up to an observed 78%. Therefore, an effective Anti-spam na-
tional policy framework will (Allah willing) have a signiﬁcant
impact on reducing this negative effect and returning the
wasted resources to these companies to be utilized in more pro-
ductive avenues.
It is further revealed from the results that the negative im-
pacts of spam are not conﬁned to internal company infrastruc-84%
0%
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11%
Direct Marketing Recruitment Firms Individuals seeking jobs
Religious Educational Governmental
Other
Figure 8 Types of fax spam received.ture such as bandwidth utilization and absorbed therein, rather
the external ripple effects continue to be far-reaching, materi-
ally negatively impacting the end-user and general productivity
at rates of up to 67%.
3.6. The manner in which stakeholders currently address spam
Addressing the issue of spam needs a multi-level approach, not
just deployment of tools and ﬁlters to prevent spam. There is
also a need to have proper processes in place to report and deal
with spam on a higher level as well as the availability of proper
awareness and education to end-users and customers. To be
able to present a comprehensive view of how stakeholders cur-
rently address spam in the Kingdom, we have looked into
three areas.
First, we looked at the existence of anti-spam solutions.
This also included the location at which the solution is de-
ployed and how the solution is conﬁgured. Second, we looked
at processes that are in place to control spam. This includes
procedures to report spam to other agencies. Finally, we
looked into whether stakeholders carry out spam awareness
programs within their organizations.
3.6.1. Anti-spam tools
It is revealed in Fig. 10 that the majority of respondents are
concerned about spam and thus they employ one or more lay-
ers of spam technical counter-measures (83% average). Natu-31 According to the stakeholders, examples of others include, but are
not limited to, the following categories, Sports, Entertainment services,
Education services, Subscription services from mobile operators.
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Figure 11 Percentage of respondents who instal their anti-spam
Tool/Filters (Incoming) as per the criteria in the graph.
26 When the anti spam solution is deployed on the server, only
incoming and outgoing e-mails are inspected and cleaned. Whereas,
when the solution is deployed on the gateway, then all the trafﬁc
ﬂowing out or into the network is inspected and cleaned. For instance,
Zombies might send e-mails that pass unidentiﬁed by a server-based
solution.
27 Realtime Blackhole List (RBL) is a list of IP addresses whose
owners refuse to stop the proliferation of spam. The RBL usually lists
server IP addresses from ISPs whose customers are responsible for the
spam and from ISPs whose servers are hijacked for spam relay.
54 M.A. Al-Kadhirally banks featured the highest coverage rate at 100% sector
coverage. This is to be expected due to the sensitivity of their
core business and the potential threat spam poses to that core
business and clientele. What was surprising though was that
not all ISPs employ such countermeasures even though it is
commonly expected that not only would ISPs be among the
companies most technically adept and likely to recognize the
threat posed by spam to themselves and their customers, but
that such a service is commonly expected as an integral part
of an ISPs core added-value services. Therefore, although at
ﬁrst glance 87% coverage for ISPs may appear to be a high
percentage, it is indeed quite low for this sector. Further, it
was discovered that ISPs appear more concerned with protect-
ing their internal e-mail accounts (47% deployment of e-mail
server-level countermeasures) than with preventing the usage
of their networks to relay spam on to others (only 13% e-mail
gateway countermeasures).
The 78% adoption of anti-spam countermeasures in ‘‘com-
panies’’ indicates a fairly high awareness level in the private
sector in general.
In general, it was also observed that on average more sur-
vey participants are likely to ﬁlter incoming e-mails for spam
(83%) than are likely to ﬁlter outgoing e-mail for potential
spam generated on their own systems and networks targeting
others (51%). Thus, taking into consideration the rampant
software piracy problem observed in KSA, these two factors
combine to make KSA a fertile breeding ground for bot-nets
and zombies.
In the case of ISPs, in addition to the fact that most of the
ISPs do not ﬁlter the e-mail trafﬁc sent by their customers
without passing through the ISP’s e-mail server, not all ISPs
check whether their own mail servers are generating spam.
Fig. 14 illustrates this point.
Detecting spam is an automated process involving auto-
matic live inspection of massive numbers of electronic mes-
sages followed by an automated response when a potential
spam message is detected. The survey classiﬁed the possible re-
sponses as being either ‘‘tag and deliver,’’ ‘‘delete,’’ ‘‘quaran-
tine,’’ ‘‘no tool,’’ or ‘‘other’’. ‘‘Delete’’ is obviously the most
dangerous approach as it potentially can result in irretrievable
loss of important messages if the anti-spam program wrongly
classiﬁes such an e-mail as spam (false-positives). We notice,
however, that ‘‘delete’’ is applied more in ISPs (where the e-
mail is directed not to the company itself but to its customers)
than in banks or private companies (where the e-mail is direc-
ted to their own employees). It appears, therefore, that the
more ‘‘personal’’ the status of the e-mail the more likely the en-
tity is to default to ‘‘quarantine’’ as opposed to ‘‘delete’’. ‘‘Tag
and deliver’’ features a more uniform distribution across sur-
vey participants (13–17%) and places a higher ﬁltering require-
ment on the end user in addition to an assumed higher
‘‘technical savvy’’ level at the end-user level to deal appropri-
ately with potential spam phishing or malware threats.
Therefore, on average, most survey participants prefer to
quarantine suspect spam messages and have qualiﬁed experts
manually deal with them later on. ‘‘Tag and deliver’’ and ‘‘de-
lete’’ tie for second place and appear to come down to internal
policy regarding whether they trust end users or the expert sys-
tem more in making the ﬁnal decision.
Another important ﬁnding that our survey revealed was the
location where the anti-spam solution is deployed to ﬁlter
incoming trafﬁc. Stakeholders average show that almost thesame percentage of respondents deploy tools on their servers26
(37%) and on their gateways (36%).
However, as indicated in Fig. 11, ISPs tend to have a differ-
ent approach. Most ISPs tend to deploy anti-spam solutions on
their servers (47%) in order to protect the mailboxes that they
host on their servers, while they tend to focus less on protecting
or ﬁltering the trafﬁc going through their network. Only 13% of
the ISPs tend to deploy anti-spam solutions on their gateways.
This means that spam originating or targeting the clients of the
ISPs can pass through the network of the ISPs’ without being
detected or ﬁltered.
Fig. 12 shows that banks and companies prefer to quaran-
tine the suspected spam e-mail messages. ISPs, on the other
hand, are divided as to whether to delete the e-mail messages
that are suspected to be spam or whether they quarantine them.
Real-time blackhole lists (RBLs)27 are considered to be efﬁ-
cient in blocking a big percentage of spam e-mails. These lists
need to get updated regularly and it also needs regular mainte-
nance in order to ensure that legitimate trafﬁc is not blocked
accidentally. In our survey, we also checked if stakeholders uti-
lize RBLs alongside their anti-spam solutions. Sadly however,
as seen in Fig. 13, we can see that on average in KSA, only
17% tend to use RBLs separately from their anti-spam solu-
tions. A higher percentage is shown in case of banks (25%).
The reason for the low adoption rate is not known and it is
suggested that this could be a prime target for an awareness
campaign. It may be that the reason for the low adoption rates
is the fear of the possible negative effects of blackholing entire
networks, or it may be that the participants simply are not
familiar with this technology. In any case, RBLs are a proven
technology and an awareness campaign is likely warranted.
Looking at the location where the tools are implemented on
the outgoing trafﬁc, our survey shows that only 8% of average
stakeholders are concerned with protecting the outgoing trafﬁc
on their gateways and in the case of ISPs only 13% are con-
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Figure 12 Percentage of respondents who conﬁgure their anti-spam tools as per the criteria in the graph.
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Figure 13 Percentage of Respondents who use a RBL solution
separately from the anti-spam Solution.
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Figure 14 Percentage of respondents who deployed e-mail anti-
spam Tools/ﬁlters (Outgoing).
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Figure 15 Percentage of respondents who installed their anti-
spam Tools/Filters (Outgoing) as per the criteria shown in the
graph.
28 Possibly, this is because ISPs are aware of the fact that having a
code of conduct with no enforcement and audit will not help to reduce
spam.
Assessment of the status of spam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 55cerned with protecting their gateways. This means that if a
subscriber instals a mail server, he/she can send spam e-mails
undetected. Additionally, this means that spam bots can send
spam e-mails undetected. Figs. 15 and 16 give a clearer picture
of the situation.
3.6.2. Processes to control spam
The second aspect that we have covered in our survey was the
processes that stakeholders have to control spam. This in-
cludes dealing with spam initially, spam reporting procedures,
any Acceptance Use Policy (AUP) with customers and code of
conduct among entities.
Our survey has showed that in the absence of a formal com-
plaints reporting process, it is not surprising (contrary to
banks) that most of the organizations deal with spam inter-
nally or do not do anything about spam complaints. Around17% of stakeholders do not even have a proper process to deal
with spam as we can see from Figs. 17 and 18.
However, the observation is different in the case of banks.
Fig. 17 shows that almost half the banks have procedures in
place to report phishing complaints to CITC and SAMA. By
developing an anti-spam framework it is expected that other
industry sectors will develop such processes as well to report
spam.
In our survey, we also tried to conﬁrm the views of stake-
holders on the best method to combat spam. As indicated in
Fig. 19:
 32% of the stakeholders see that having an anti-spam law
was the most effective manner in which their organizations
could combat spam.
 26% of stakeholders also agreed that having a proper code
of conduct between service providers would help substan-
tially in preventing spam, though interestingly, only 13%
of ISPs believed that having a code of conduct among them
will help in combating spam.28
 24% of stakeholders (especially ISPs and Companies) saw
that deploying anti-spam tools was a sufﬁcient measure to
prevent spam.
29%
28%
33%
8%
6%
13%
12%
6%
27%
6%
8%
0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Stakeholders Average
Companies
ISPs
Server Gateway DMZ Other
Figure 16 Percentage of respondents who instaled their anti-spam Tools/Filters (Outgoing) as per the criteria shown in the graph by
Stakeholders’ types.
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Figure 17 Percentage of the stakeholders who take one of the
actions listed in the graph when spam is detected by stakeholders’
type.
17%
49%
10%
5%
No process to deal with SPAM Deal with it internally
Report to CITC Report to a Governmental Agency
Report to Police Report to SAMA
Figure 18 Percentage of the stakeholders who take one of the
actions listed in the graph when spam is detected.
56 M.A. Al-Kadhi 15% of stakeholders agreed that having strict eMarketing
rules, including possibly a code of conduct, between e-mar-
keting service providers could help in controlling spam.29
This led us to have a look at two other aspects: do service
providers ensure that their customers do not abuse the services
offered to them, and do service providers cooperate among
each others in combating spam? First, we noticed in our survey
that 46% of service providers (Fig. 20) do not have any anti-
spam provisions in their Acceptance Use Policy (AUP). The
inclusion of such clauses can help greatly in controlling spam
originating from Saudi Arabia. Second, we have also discov-
ered that 93% of service providers (Fig. 21) are not aware of
any existing code of conduct among service providers. This
means that there is no cooperation between service providers
to control spam.29 This reﬂects the importance of the industry assistance in the battle
against spam. Although legislation is critical, having an industry-
speciﬁc guideline which is more customized to a speciﬁc industry is of
great importance.3.6.3. Spam awareness programs
Finally, in this survey we tried to identify the level of aware-
ness that stakeholders provide to their customers/employees.
The results were very surprising as we can see from Fig. 22.
The stakeholders’ average of 24% shows that organizations
are not putting much effort in educating their employees and
customers on how to deal with spam, revealing a prime candi-
date for a quick win action plan. However, banks have scored
very high (86%) in conducting awareness programs to their
employees and customers.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
The purpose of this study, commissioned by the Communica-
tions and Information Technology Commission, is to ascertain
the magnitude of spam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its for-
mal deﬁnition and the key stakeholders involved. The focus of
the study was to obtain a good understanding of the issue of
spam within Saudi Arabia. This study comprises one core mod-
ule of an overarching ‘‘Anti-spam policy framework study’’
aimed at providing a comprehensive multi-tiered solution for
handling spam in Saudi Arabia based upon best international
practices, current situation and national requirements.
A wide swath of relevant stakeholders was contacted during
the course of this study in commercial, governmental and
0%
3%
6%
9%
15%
24%
26%
32%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Other
No need to control it
Establish an Industry Forum
Awarness
Code of Conduct for eMarketing
service providers
Anti-SPAM tools
Code of Conduct for service
providers
Anti-SPAM law
Figure 19 Stakeholders’ View on How to Combat spam.
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Figure 22 Stakeholders running an Awareness Program.
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meetings. The study covered multiple transmission mediums
of spam such as fax, SMS and e-mail, multiple categories based
upon content, such as phishing, sports, direct marketing, reli-
gious, sexual, and multiple others, and ﬁnally the state of spam
countermeasures and awareness overall in these organizations.
An additional beneﬁt of this studywas to formalize a universally
accepted deﬁnition for spam and also highlights some of the
stakeholders’ concerns and recommendations regarding spam.
During this study, all pertinent stakeholders in a proposed
‘‘national Anti-spam framework’’ were identiﬁed and a frame-
work for the collection of spam-related statistics was devel-
oped. This framework covers e-mail, SMS and fax and is
focused on three aspects. First, the deﬁnition of spam and re-
lated spam indicators where ‘‘spam rate’’ is deﬁned as the per-
centage of spam compared to the total number of received
messages. Second, the identiﬁcation of sources for spam re-
lated statistics where, in addition to interviews, ﬁlters and
anti-spam tools used by organizations and ISPs were the main
source for determining e-mail spam while gateways and servers
owned by mobile service providers were used to calculate SMS
spam. Third, the collection of spam statistics achieved by
inspecting published reliable data and by conducting survey,
interviews and discussions with relevant personnel including
CITC, KACST, MOC, MOI, SAMA30, companies, ﬁnancial
services institutions, Internet service providers, data service
providers, bulk SMS licensees, mobile operators, solution pro-
viders and others.
Although the spam rate differs depending on where the
spam is being measured, spam appears to be a serious problem
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. According to the data gath-
ered by ISPs, the average e-mail spam rate in the Kingdom was
54%. On the other hand, fax spam was not considered to be a
major source of spam with less than 6% spam rate. The Direct
marketing messages constitute the major type of spam received
in the Kingdom reﬂecting the majority of commercial spam in
the globe. As for the SMS spam, mobile operators reported
that the SMS spam rate ranges between 1.25% and 1.75%,30 CITC, Communications and Information Technology Commis-
sion; SAMA, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; KACST, King
Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology; MOC, Ministry of
Commerce; MOI, Ministry of Interior.
Table 1 Breakdown of SPAM rates in KSA.
E-mail spam rate Dominant spam type Fax spam rate SMS spam rate Using RBLs Spam tools deployed
Average 54% Commercial 6% 1.25–1.75% 17% 83%
58 M.A. Al-Kadhialthough it was informally observed one year after the conduc-
tion of this survey that the SMS spam rate appears to have ri-
sen dramatically, possibly over tenfold, and it would,
therefore, be beneﬁcial to re-conduct this survey to compare
results as it appears that we have hit the leading edge of the
SMS spam wave in KSA in this survey.
The main ﬁndings are summarized in the Table 1.
Spam e-mails, in addition to being an annoyance to individ-
uals, cause capacity, bandwidth, and staff performance prob-
lems. While most of the companies believe that the primary
impact of spam was on their e-mail server resources, network,
and time wasted, ISPs considered that their customers were
most affected by spam. Bandwidth and productivity were also
highly affected.
Considering the impact of spam in the Kingdom, it
appeared that most organizations, with the exception of banks,
did not expend much effort in educating their employees and
customers on how to deal with spam. Most banks conduct
awareness programs to their employees and customers.
Noticeably, almost 83% of stakeholders have tools targeted
at combating spam. However, it is worthwhile noting that ISPs
focus on ﬁltering the e-mail trafﬁc hitting the mail servers
hosted in the ISP’s Data center. They do not ﬁlter all trafﬁc
(especially outgoing trafﬁc) due to the existing constraints in
budgets, resources and the shortage of technically capable
staff. Indeed, ISPs employing Real-time blackhole lists (RBLs)
reported lower spam rates.
With the absence of a formal complaints reporting process,
it is not surprising that most organizations deal with spam
internally or even ignore the spam complaints. On the other
hand, the observation is different in the case of banks where
half of them have procedures in place to report phishing com-
plaints to CITC and SAMA.
When it comes to industry, it was obvious that there is no
code of conduct for ISPs or e-marketing in Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, half of the service providers do not have any provi-
sions in their acceptable use policy (AUP) covering spam.
As recommended by the well-known international bodies,
to combat spam, different areas shall be addresses, such as le-
gal, enforcement, technical, awareness, industry assistance, etc.
According to the majority of stakeholders, the legal side is of
most importance to combat spam in the kingdom while having
a proper code of conduct between service providers would help
substantially in preventing spam.
As indicated by the study, spam constitutes a serious prob-
lem as being an annoyance to people, organizations and ser-
vice providers. As mentioned, there is little awareness of
spam, no codes of conduct for service providers and e-Market-
ers. Moreover, stipulations provided through licenses granted
to ISPs, bulk SMS service providers and Bluetooth providers
are not audited or enforced.
This justiﬁes the need to develop an anti-spam framework
for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. By developing an anti-spam
framework coupled with robust enforcement, ensuring industry
assistance, running awareness programs, implementing techni-
cal solutions, ongoing monitoring of spam rates and focusingthe control on commercial spam we can reduce the amount
of spam signiﬁcantly in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Spam e-mails, in addition to being an annoyance to individ-
uals, cause capacity, bandwidth, and staff performance prob-
lems. While most of the companies believe that the primary
impact of spam was on their e-mail server resources, network
and time wasted, ISPs considered that their customers were
most affected by spam. Bandwidth and productivity were also
highly affected.
Considering the impact of spam in the Kingdom, it ap-
peared that most organizations, with the exception of banks,
did not expend much effort in educating their employees and
customers on how to deal with spam. Most banks conduct
awareness programs to their employees and customers.
Noticeably, almost 83% of stakeholders have tools targeted
at combating spam. However, it is worthwhile noting that ISPs
focus on ﬁltering the e-mail trafﬁc hitting the mail servers
hosted in the ISP’s Data center. They do not ﬁlter all trafﬁc
(especially outgoing trafﬁc) due to the existing constraints in
budgets, resources and the shortage of technically capable
staff. Indeed, ISPs employing Real-time Blackhole Lists
(RBLs) reported lower spam rates.
With the absence of a formal complaints reporting process,
it is not surprising that most organizations deal with spam
internally or even ignore the spam complaints. On the other
hand, the observation is different in the case of banks where
half of them have procedures in place to report phishing com-
plaints to CITC and SAMA.
When it comes to industry, it was obvious that there is no
code of conduct for ISPs or e-marketing in Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, half of the service providers do not have any provi-
sions in their acceptable use policy (AUP) covering spam.
Where to go from here? Action is required to utilize this
information in the development of a targeted national anti-
spam policy framework which will utilize the above spam def-
inition and ﬁndings to (Allah willing) effectively combat spam
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is also suggested that fur-
ther benchmarking studies be conducted in line with this one to
gauge the effectiveness of the application of that policy frame-
work and the possible need to redirect or ﬁne-tune it in order
to best achieve the envisioned goals.
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